The Efficiencies Defense in Mergers:  The Baby-Food Case Reconsidered by Richards, Daniel J & Dagen, Richard B
The Efficiencies Defense in Mergers:  The Baby-Food Case Reconsidered 
Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of Heinz 
and Beech-Nut baby food operations in 2001 remains a controversial case that raises concern 
over the role of cost efficiencies in merger analysis.  Although the FTC argued that the merger 
would result in an increased likelihood of coordinated effects, we develop an alternative 
explanation for why the merger was likely to harm consumers even in the absence of such 
cooperation.  We show that a conventional model of vertical product differentiation is able to 
replicate the premerger market data.  Vertical product differentiation assumes that consumers 
agree on the relative quality of different products, which seems to describe the baby food 
market.  When the model is then used to determine potential post-merger outcomes, we find 
that only using the most favorable assumptions for Heinz, would the claimed cost-efficiencies 
have been passed on to consumers.  Under any more conservative and realistic scenarios, 
consumer prices rise substantially.  The analysis supports the decision to oppose the merger.  It 
also raises some doubt about the merit of cost efficiencies as a merger defense when an 
industry is characterized by vertical product differentiation.
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1.  Introduction
     The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) successful challenge to the proposed acquisition 
of the Beech-Nut baby food company by Heinz in the summer of 2000 remains one of the most 
controversial merger cases in recent years.  While some analysts consider that effort broadly 
consistent with the modern antitrust analysis and policy2 others, such as Robert Hahn and former 
FTC economist, Jonathan Baker, have argued that the merger should have been allowed.3  At one 
conference discussing efficiencies, one noted antitrust practitioner observed, “I think it’s quite 
possible that this case will live in antitrust infamy, maybe much more so than any antitrust case 
I’ve seen.”4  Another noted, “The Heinz-Beech-Nut case, I agree with all the negative things that 
have been said about that decision, I think it’s going to be the Proctor and Gamble/Clorox of our 
generation.”5  These statements were made despite the fact that five out of five D.C. Circuit 
judges, at least two of whom were extremely well-versed in antitrust law and economics, found 
that the proposed merger did raise substantial questions.6
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 In a rare decision, the DC Circuit granted the FTC’s motion for an emergency stay following the lower court’s ruling 
to permit the merger.  FTC v. Heinz, 2000 Trade Cas. (CCH) P73,090 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2000).  The panel consisted 
2This case obviously has given rise to spirited debate.  In this paper, we present a new 
framework in which to analyze the issues raised by the baby food case including, specifically, 
the role of cost efficiencies in overall merger policy.   Our analytical framework uses a vertical 
product differentiation model, a standard theory familiar to most economists.  However, its 
application to a merger setting is somewhat new.  Our results suggest that there were solid 
theoretical reasons to oppose the baby food merger even in the face of strong cost savings and 
even if the merger did not increase the likelihood of coordinated interaction between the post-
merger entity and Gerber.  The reason is that use of a vertical product differentiation model 
shows that Heinz’s profit maximizing strategy would be to maintain its value brand even if it 
realized substantial efficiencies, and that there would be very little, if any, pass-through of cost 
savings to consumers.  Indeed, this model predicts that prices would likely have risen 
substantially.  While the FTC did not rely on these arguments at the time, the analysis may have 
implications for future merger cases. 
2.  The Baby Food Case: Background
The essentials of the baby food case are relatively straightforward.  In the summer of 2000, 
Heinz proposed to acquire Beech-Nut.  Baby food was clearly the only market relevant for 
antitrust analysis and the FTC presented a conventional antimerger argument.  The market for 
prepared or jarred baby food was an asymmetric triopoly.  The dominant firm was the Gerber 
Corporation with approximately 65 to 70 percent of the market.7  The other two major firms were 
Heinz and Beech-Nut, which, while important players, were somewhat distant also-rans with 
of Judges Ginsburg, Garland, and Tatel.   The merits panel consisted of Judges Garland, Henderson, and Randolph.  
Judge Ginsburg is a former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust appointed by President Reagan (1984-85), and 
Judge Garland has taught antitrust at Harvard Law School.  
7The market share varied somewhat by type of baby food, and whether or not private label was included.  But the 
parties and the court effectively ignored these variations, and so shall we.
3market shares of roughly 17 percent and 15 percent, respectively.  There had been virtually no 
entry into the market over the prior 40 years and all parties admitted that entry barriers were high.  
In short, the baby food market at the time of the merger had a high Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI)8 of about 5000 and threatened to raise that index by over 500 points.  As a result, 
the proposed merger clearly fell within the danger zone established by the DOJ/FTC merger 
guidelines in which the presumption is that the merger will lessen competition.  Moreover, new 
entry could not be relied on to provide additional competition in the post-merger market.  In 
addition, beyond the structural and entry considerations that could apply even with a larger 
number of firms, the Heinz/Beech-Nut merger would result in a duopoly.  This raised the 
additional fear that it would greatly facilitate pricing coordination to the further detriment of 
consumer interests.  Indeed, this was the principal argument advanced by the FTC, and it 
played a significant role in the appellate court decision to block the merger.9  The FTC noted 
8HHI is a measure of market concentration generated by summing the squares of the market shares in a relevant 
market.  For example, if there are three firms with shares of 70, 20, and 10, the HHI is (70x70 + 20x20 + 10x10) 
= 5500.  The maximum HHI is 10,000.  HHIs over 1800 raise a presumption of anticompetitive effects where the 
“delta” – the increase in the HHI resulting from a merger, is over 50.  See Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5.
9 FTC  v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001):
The combination of a concentrated market and barriers to entry is a recipe for price coordination. See 
University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218 n.24 ("Significant market concentration makes it 'easier for firms in 
the market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above the 
competitive level.' " (citation omitted)). "[W]here rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their 
behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding, in order to restrict output and achieve 
profits above competitive levels." PPG, 798 F.2d at 1503. The creation of a durable duopoly affords 
both the opportunity and incentive for both firms to coordinate to increase prices. The district court 
recognized this when it questioned Baker on whether the merged entity will, up to a point, expand its 
market share but "then [with Gerber will] find a nice equilibrium and they'll all get along together." 
9/8/2000 Tr. 1014. Tacit coordination is feared by antitrust policy even more than express collusion, for 
tacit coordination, even when observed, cannot easily be controlled directly by the antitrust laws. It is a 
central object of merger policy to obstruct the creation or reinforcement by merger of such oligopolistic 
market structures in which tacit coordination can occur.  4 Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & 
John L. Solow, Antitrust Law ¶ 901b2, at 9 (rev. ed. 1998). Because the district court failed to specify 
any "structural market barriers to collusion" that are unique to the baby food industry, its conclusion 
that the ordinary presumption of collusion in a merger to duopoly was rebutted is clearly erroneous.
4that the baby food companies had defended themselves in a price fixing case by maintaining 
that there was fierce competition between and among all of the companies.10  One of the most 
significant documents relied upon by the Commission and the DC Court of Appeals was from 
Heinz indicating that it was in a bidding and price war with Beech-Nut and one of the best way 
out of this was to buy Beech-Nut.11  The Commission and the Court of Appeals concluded that 
competition would be lost if the merger was consummated.
In defense of the merger, Heinz and Beech-Nut offered two main justifications.  The first 
was a cost efficiencies argument.  The merging parties argued that while Heinz and Gerber had 
relatively modern production facilities, Beech-Nut’s plant in Canajoharie, New York was largely 
out-of-date with the result that Beech-Nut’s unit cost of bringing the product to market was on 
the order of 15 to 20 percent higher than those of its rivals.  The reallocation of this production to 
more efficient plants that the merger would make possible was therefore a potential cost savings 
that could be passed on to consumers.  
The second line of defense extended the cost efficiencies justification by further arguing that
realization of those efficiencies would create a new fierce rival to the Gerber giant.  Gerber and, 
to a lesser extent, Beech-Nut enjoyed recognition among consumers as a quality brands, while 
Heinz was typically regarded as a “discount” baby food.  The merging parties contended that in 
the post-merger market they would offer the Beech-Nut quality product but now do so at a much 
lower cost with the result that the new firm would, in fact, offer much more price-competition to 
Gerber than the two weak rivals, Beech-Nut and Heinz offered separately.  This was especially 
the case, it was argued, when one considered scale effects.  By combining the operation of the 
10
 The testimony of Dr. Almarin Phillips—an economist retained by Heinz at that time—was particularly 
insistent on this point.  See In Re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F. 3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).
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5two firms, the new entity would have a strong incentive to compete against Gerber aggressively 
so as to earn the large market share that would make the efficiencies all the more likely.  In short, 
Heinz argued that the post-merger entity would create competition by becoming a maverick in a 
moribund industry.12
Proponents of the merger further supported their arguments with econometric evidence that 
the cross-elasticity of demand between Heinz and Beech-Nut was low.13  Thus, it was argued 
that there was little retail price competition between Heinz and Beech-Nut. As a result, proponents 
claimed  that a merger between the two could not have much adverse effect on consumers.14
3.  The Baby Food Market: Theoretical Considerations
Like many retail consumer goods markets, the baby food market is one of differentiated 
products.  It follows that any evaluation of the post-merger market outcome needs to specify 
the nature of that differentiated product competition to see how it might play out in the post-
merger world.  Unfortunately, the theoretical economics literature does not give a unique 
answer to this question.  There are different types of product differentiation and, as well, 
different competitive assumptions about price competition within these alternative frameworks.   
Thus, forecasting the post-merger scenario may depend heavily on the framework and 
associated competitive assumptions one chooses.
With respect to the analytical market framework, there are two basic approaches.  The 
first of these is referred to as horizontal product differentiation and was pioneered by 
12 See e.g., Trial tr. 1013 (Testimony of Professor Baker); Baker, Mavericks, supra note __ (“Heinz claimed, in 
contrast, that the merger would destabilize the possibility of postmerger coordination by creating a maverick”). 
13
 Trial tr. 953-55 (Testimony of Professor Baker).
14Some, see, e.g., David Scheffman, “Whither Merger Simulation, Transcript of ABA Brown Bag Presentation, 
reprinted in Antitrust Source, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/05-04/whither.pdf, (May 2004), have been 
notably critical of such econometric evidence and in particular, what elasticities estimated at the retail level may 
or may not imply for wholesale competition. 
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6Hotelling and Salop.15  These models are built on the assumption that consumers agree on 
how much they are willing to pay for a top quality brand but disagree on what constitutes the 
top quality.  In the simplest case, the metric of quality is geographic so that the closer a store 
is to one’s location, the higher quality one considers its products to be.  
However, as Hotelling emphasized, the dimension of differentiation can be sweetness, or 
color, or other alternative measure.  A common interpretation is that the distinctions are really 
due to brand-building efforts on the part of the firm.  In this view, the “location” of each 
firm’s product reflects its commitment of resources to develop the brand image associated 
with that product position.  
In a rough way, most merger simulations are rooted in a horizontal differentiation 
framework.16  Indeed, such simulations can be seen as an effort to operationalize that framework 
in a realistic way.  One difficulty that arises in this connection is the product selection choice of 
the surviving Heinz/Beech-Nut firm.  The own-price and cross elasticities measured in the pre-
merger market are based on the existence of three distinct products. However, in the post-merger 
market, there would be just two product lines and it is not obvious how the pre-merger 
elasticities apply in this new setting.   Thus, while the empirical evidence is useful, theory may 
also have a role to play if it can provide additional insight into the post-merger market.  
Indeed, to the extent that the market is one of differentiated products and given that 
Heinz/Beech-Nut made clear its intent to offer only one post-merger product line, it is clear that 
15
 H. Hotelling, “Stability in Competition,” 39 Econ. J. 41 (Jan. 1929).
16We have in mind simulations similar to those employed in, among others, the following articles:  Timothy 
Bresnahan & Jonathan Baker, “The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product Differentiated Industries,” 38 J. 
Industrial Econ. 427 (1985); Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb, “The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products 
Industries:  Structural Merger Policy and the Logit Model,” 10 J. L., Econ. & Org. 407 (1994); Jonathan Baker, 
“Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis,” 5 George Mason L. Rev. 347 (1997), J. Hausman & G. Leonard, 
“Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Merges Using Real World Data,” 5 George Mason L. Rev. 321 
(1997); Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, “Merger Simulation:  A Simplified Approach with New Applications,” 
Working Paper from UCB Dept. of Economics (2001).
7the post-merger outcome would depend importantly on whether post-merger product line was 
different from the Gerber product line, and if so, by how much.  This is another reason that, as 
Schefman has argued, the empirical evidence may not be that helpful.17  The newly-merged 
firm’s product selection choice is a strategic one made with a view to maximizing profit.  
Ideally, this choice should be an outcome generated by the analytical model chosen.  Yet, it is 
not clear how the econometric evidence can be used to address this product choice question 
since, again, that evidence is derived from data generated by a three-product world.18
An alternative to the model of horizontal product differentiation is that based on vertical 
differentiation presented initially by Mussa and Rosen, Gabszewicz and Thisse, and Shaked and 
Sutton.19  Here, consumers actually do agree on how the products rank in quality.  That is, each 
consumer shares the same view regarding the quality of the top product, that of the second best 
product, and so on.   Now, the differences among consumers stem from disagreements over how 
much each is willing to pay for a higher quality brand.  Some consumers value increased quality 
very highly and are willing to pay a lot for it.  Other consumers do not value quality so highly.  
For these consumers, buying a low quality good at a low price is preferable to buying a high 
quality product at a high price.   As with the distance in the horizontal models, quality in the 
vertical models can be given various definitions such as how safe the product is or the level of 
17
 Scheffman, supra note 14.
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 Gandhi, Froeb, Tschantz, and Werden (2005) acknowledge this issue explicitly.  See also Malcolm Coate,
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An Institutionalist View, 13 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189 (2005):
Nash-Bertrand models also assume that each firm's product offerings remain constant over time.  This is a 
striking assumption in the world of differentiated products where firms compete by offering products to serve 
diverse consumer needs.  It appears that the model's mathematical structure abstracts from a crucial source of 
reality and thus undermines its general applicability.  Although theoretical models exist to partially address this 
situation so the analyst could utilize more sophisticated state-of-the-art models, even a state of the art model 
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8ancillary services provided by the supplier.  Again, however, a common interpretation is that the 
quality distinctions reflect a brand effect so that a well-known or premium brand is considered to 
be a higher quality than a generic brand.  
One implication of the vertically differentiated model is that the ranking of product prices 
should match the ranking of product qualities.  That is, the product uniformly regarded as the 
highest quality should sell for the highest price, the next-highest quality should sell for the 
next-highest price, and so on.  This is so regardless of each firm’s individual cost so long as the 
firm can break even.  The reason for this ranking is straightforward.  No consumer will pay as 
much for a product of lower quality as she would for a product of higher quality.  Hence, unless 
lower-quality goods sell at lower prices, no one will buy them.  
4.  The Baby Food Market: A Vertical View
Market share and price data were widely available at the time of the proposed merger.  
As noted above, the market share data showed  Gerber dominating the market with a roughly 
65 to 70 percent share, while Heinz and Beech-Nut split the remainder rather evenly.  With 
respect to prices, there was some dispute over the role of the coupon reductions frequently 
offered by the two smaller firms.  In general, however, Gerber’s prices were highest, followed 
by Beech-Nut, and then Heinz, which was known as the discount brand.  Indeed, former FTC 
economist Jonathan Baker (2000)20 stated that at the retail level, a price per four-ounce jar 
was $0.40 for Gerber, $0.38 for Beech-Nut, and $0.33 to $0.35 for Heinz.
  As can be seen, the hierarchical ranking of prices suggests a vertically differentiated 
framework in which Gerber is the premium brand, Heinz is the low-quality brand, and Beech-Nut 
is somewhere in between.  We take this suggestion seriously.  That is, we ask whether additional 
20
 Jonathan Baker (2004), and Trial tr. 1074-75 (Professor Baker).
9evidence is consistent with a vertical framework in which consumers rank the quality of the three 
products in the way suggested by the product prices.  To the extent that this is the case, we then 
ask what does such a vertical framework imply for the likely post-merger outcome? 
Certainly, the trial evidence left little doubt that the comparison of the Gerber and Heinz 
prices is consistent with a widespread industry review that Gerber was perceived as a higher 
quality product than Heinz.  Where Beech-Nut’s baby food ranked in consumer preferences 
though is somewhat unclear.  At least two bits of evidence however point to a quality ranking 
somewhere between the Heinz and Gerber brands just as the priced data indicate.  First, Beech-
Nut had been viewed as a discount brand up until the 1980’s when it tried to raise its quality 
image by introducing its Stages  line.  Since brand images take years to develop, it is more than 
plausible that consumers still viewed the Beech-Nut line as a less than fully premium product.21
Second, as the appellate court noted, Beech-Nut consciously kept its price below Gerber’s.  Yet 
there would be no need to do this if Beech-Nut were the top quality baby food.  Indeed, the cost 
advantage that Beech-Nut was alleged to suffer should have given it even more reason to price at 
the high end if it had been the superior brand.  The fact that it consciously did not do this thus 
suggests that Beech-Nut was a lower quality than Gerber and, moreover, knew it.22
We now test the idea that the baby food market may be usefully viewed through the lens of 
vertical differentiation in a somewhat more rigorous fashion.  Specifically, we ask whether it is 
possible to calibrate a vertically differentiated model that approximately replicates both the 
observed prices, market shares and cost differentials that were reported at the time of the merger.  
The analytical details of the model are spelled out in the Appendix.  The results are shown in 
21 See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation 166 F.3d  112, 116 (3d Cir. 1999).  “Gerber is the undisputed market 
leader and premium brand” and evidence reviewed therein.
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Table 1.  Like Epstein and Rubinfeld, we keep things simple by assuming one unified market and 
making no distinction between wholesale and retail.23
     Table 1
             Pre-Merger Values Calibrated by the Vertically Differentiated Product Model
                                         Price               Market        
Per Jar Share
                        Gerber                 $ 0.425              69.5%   
                        Beech- Nut             $ 0.375              13.9%             
                        Heinz                     $ 0.342              16.6%        
The simulated results reported in Table 1 are strikingly close to the real world observations.   
Recall that the actual prices reported were $0.40, $0.38, and $0.33 - $0.35 for Gerber, Beech-
Nut, and Heinz, respectively.  Recall as well that Heinz had a slightly larger market share than 
Beech-Nut but that both were on the order of 15 percent while Gerber’s share was in the range of 
65 – 69 percent.  Finally, with respect to Beech-Nut’s cost disadvantage, the trial judge reports 
an estimate of 20 percent while Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) cite Jonathan Baker as suggesting 
a 15 percent figure.  The estimates above imply a value of 17 percent.    
The results of the simulation also make clear an important feature of vertically differentiated 
markets.  This is the disproportionately strong position of the top quality brand. For example, the 
quality index settings used to calibrate the model are such that the Beech-Nut brand is only about 
four percent lower quality than Gerber.  Nevertheless, Gerber’s position as the top brand, along 
with Beech-Nut’s higher costs, translates into a very large competitive advantage for Gerber.   In 
short, in all crucial respects the simulated values in Table 1 almost exactly replicate those of the 
22
 Judge Robertson found at trial that Beech-Nut quality is “generally comparable to Gerber,” (Slip op. at 4).  This 
conclusion seems contrary to other evidence in the record particularly both Beech-Nut’s earlier history as a discount 
brand and the twin facts that it: a) consistently priced below Gerber, yet: b) nevertheless had a smaller market share.  
23
 As long as the retail sector is competitive, this should have no impact on the analysis.  Note that our prices are 
long-run, retail prices.  So, the costs that we impute include both capital costs and retailing costs.  These imputed 
costs per jar are:  $0.31 for Gerber and Heinz, and $0.362 for Beech-Nut.  
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actual pre-merger baby food market.  Indeed, each calibrated value is within a 5 percent margin 
of the actual data in every case.  Yet these calibrations are totally derived from a theoretical 
construct that simply sets initial consumer preferences and quality index parameters and then 
works out the implications of these values in a standard model of three-way price competition in 
a vertically differentiated market.24
We read the findings in Table 1 as strong support for the view that the baby food market at 
the time of the proposed Heinz and Beech-Nut merger can be reasonably well-modeled by a 
vertically differentiated framework. The nature of that vertical differentiation is such that 
consumers agree that:  Gerber is the top quality product, Beech-Nut is the intermediate quality 
good, and Heinz is the discount brand.25  The question then becomes what this analytical 
framework implies regarding the likely outcome of a Heinz/Beech-Nut combination.
5.  Consequences of the Heinz/Beech-Nut Merger
We begin by asking a simple question.  Given the calibrated model’s ability to closely 
replicate the pre-merger baby food market, what does the model imply for the post- market 
outcomes if the newly merged firm does indeed market a product of Beech-Nut quality and does 
so at the lower unit cost of Heinz.  Because everything goes as well as could possibly be expected, 
we refer to this scenario as the Utopian one.  The results of the subsequent calibration using the 
cost and quality values inferred from the pre-merger analysis are shown in Table 2 below.
24
 At trial, Heinz expert economist, Jonathan Baker, argued that the most likely description of the pre-merger market 
was one in which Gerber acted as a dominant firm exercising price leadership.  Gerber’s large market share was 
offered in support of such a view.  Note however that the vertically differentiated model here generates the observed 
price and market share data without such dominant  price leadership.  In other words, the data are perfectly 
consistent price competition being alive and well in the pre-merger market despite the Gerber’s large market share. 
25
 In the baby food market, supermarkets almost always carry only two major brands.  Gerber is found in virtually 
on stores, while Heinz and Beech-Nut compete to be the second brand on the shelf.   This market fact does not 
preclude viewing the market as vertically differentiated.  For example, the supermarket’s choice may serve as the 
proxy for the consumer’s judgment on quality.  
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        Table 2
           Impact of Merger Under Utopian Scenario
           Of Heinz/Beech-Nut
      Change from            Post-Merger
Pre-Merger Price Market Share
Gerber                            - 1.2%                         67%
       Heinz/Beech-Nut           - 2.7%                         33%
As one can see from Table 2, the model predicts that post-merger prices will fall by a modest 
amount.  The Gerber price falls by 1.2 percent while the price of the Beech-Nut product (in 
comparison with the price of pre-merger Beech-Nut baby food) falls by 2.7 percent.  This greater 
reduction in price of the Beech-Nut line does eat into Gerber’s market share, which declines by 
approximately 2.5 percent.   While these are positive gains, they are not large.  This is true despite 
the fact that this scenario assumes that all of the claimed cost efficiencies are realized.  The 
intuition behind this somewhat surprising result is two-fold.  First, recall that Beech-Nut initially 
enjoyed only a 14 percent market share.  A 17 percent reduction in the cost of this product line is 
therefore only about an eight percent reduction over the non-Gerber portion of the market.26
Moreover, this small effect is offset somewhat by the loss of the Heinz versus Beech-Nut 
competition.  In fact, prior consumers of Heinz suffer a price increase.27
The second reason that even this utopian scenario results in only modest consumer benefits 
stems from the feature noted above about vertical differentiation and brand strength.  Again, when 
a market is vertically differentiated, the highest quality firm enjoys a very large advantage such 
that it serves a disproportionately large market share and earns extra high profits.  Thus, Gerber 
tends to maintain its dominance even in the face of a lower-cost rival selling Beech- Nut quality.
26
 The D.C. Circuit recognized this point.  246 F.3d at 721 (“After the merger, the two entities will be combined, and 
to determine whether the merged entity will be a significantly more efficient competitor, cost reductions must be 
measured across the new entity's combined production - not just across the pre-merger output of Beech-Nut.”)
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Note that while consumer gains from the merger are small, the profit gains are substantial.  
Prior to the merger, the average operating margin across the two product lines combined was just 
a bit over seven percent.  With the merger, the new combined firm earns an average markup of 
eighteen percent while slightly increasing its total market share.28 Whatever the interests of 
consumers, it is clear that the merger is profitable for Heinz and Beech-Nut.29
One implication of the findings displayed in Table 2 is that failure to achieve the full 
amount of the claimed cost efficiencies could well mean that the consumer welfare would 
necessarily decline as a result of the merger.30   This is, of course, a legitimate worry. Merging 
parties have strong incentives to claim efficiencies as a justification for the acquisition, yet the 
historical record gives substantial reason to doubt such claims.  Table 3 shows the results when 
27
 Here, we compare the post-merger price of Heinz/Beech-Nut with the pre-merger price of Beech-Nut, the line that 
continues to be offered.  Note that while these price effects are mildly beneficial, some consumers are worse off in 
that they have now lost the option of buying a low quality product, i.e., Heinz, at a lower price.
28
 Throughout all simulations, we make the standard assumption that the market is “covered”, i.e., that prices are 
sufficiently low that all potential baby food customers purchase one of the available brands.
29An illustrative calculation may help.  Let there be 1,000,000 customers.  In the pre-merger market (Table 1) 
Heinz serves 166,000 of these, and earns ($0.342 – $0.31) from each.  Total profit is $5,312 per period.  
Similarly, Beech-Nut serves 139,000 and earns ($0.342 - $0.31) from each.  Economic profit--profit beyond a 
normal return on capital--is $5,312 per period.  Similarly, Beech-Nut serves 139,000 earning ($0.375 -  $0.36) 
from each for an economic profit of $2,085 per period.  Thus, the combined pre-merger periodic profit of both 
firms is $7,397.  In the post-merger market (Table 2), Heinz/Beech-Nut serves 330,000 customers earning 
($0.365 - $0.31) from each.  Total profit is $18,150 per period.  The merger is profitable. 
    Put another way, under the Utopian scenario, the cost savings to Heinz/BN total approximately $6950.  The total 
savings to BN consumers equals $1390.  This would imply a pass through rate of approximately 20% (leaving aside 
Heinz consumers that gain quality but must pay more).   The remainder of the cost savings, as shown above, would 
translate into higher profits for the merged entity.  Cf. Trial Tr. 1113 (Professor Baker)(estimates pass through of 50-
100%).  The agencies do not undertake a total welfare analysis but focus on the impact of the merger on consumers 
in the relevant product line.  As a result, the enforcement agencies and courts often focus on pass-through rates when 
efficiencies are at issue.  See DOJ & FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, “Efficiencies” (“the Agency considers 
whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the 
relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market”).  See also FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 
1090 (D.D.C. 1997)  (pass-through of efficiencies based on historical data would be approximately 15 percent).  
30
 Coate discusses some of the issues regarding the measurement of efficiencies for the purpose of merger analysis:
Efficiencies are also likely to raise a range of measurement problems.  Efficiency effects are driven by 
the magnitude of the benefits, the pass-through of the savings (both in the short and long run), the 
probabilities the efficiency claims are cognizable and the duration of the efficiencies.   Again, it is 
possible that the analyst would attempt to summarize the savings in a single number (i.e. six percent 
savings in out-years 3 to 8); however such a conclusion could require heroic probability assumptions. 
Instead, it is often necessary to consider a range of efficiency information addressing expected savings, 
relevant probabilities, pass-throughs and timing profiles.
14
the merger yields just half of the claimed cost savings. That is, the newly merged firm produces 
the Beech-Nut quality line but does so at an 8.5 percent cost disadvantage relative to Gerber, 
i.e., at a cost of about $0.336 per jar.
Table 3
        Impact of Proposed Mergers When Only 
       Half the Claimed Cost Efficiencies Are Realized 
       And Beech-Nut Quality Is Achieved 
                                                    Change from             Post-Merger
Pre-Merger Price Market Share
Gerber                         +0.72%                       72%
                       Heinz/Beech-Nut         +1.96%                        28%
Reducing the cost efficiencies clearly reduces the consumer benefits of the merger.  Once 
only half the savings are realized, prices rise by an average of one percent across the entire 
market.  Indeed, further simulation shows that the impact on consumers turns from positive to 
negative if all but 30 percent of the claimed cost efficiencies are realized.  Market prices rise 
slightly and, as before, there is an additional loss that results from a reduction in variety.  Once 
again, however, the combined profit of Beech-Nut and Heinz still rises as their margin over cost 
rises to 13.7 percent.31  That is, the merging firms have good reason to combine their operations 
and to press the courts for the legal right to do so even if only 50 percent of the claimed 
efficiencies are achieved but consumers suffer even if 70 percent of the savings are realized.
Failure to achieve the claimed cost efficiencies is however only one of the possible problems 
that could arise in the post-merger market.  There are at least two others.  The first arises in 
connection with the product selection issue noted earlier.  While Heinz and Beech-Nut claimed 
that they would market a Beech-Nut quality product, the fact is that they have very little incentive 
31The calculation is conceptually identical to that in note 20, supra.  The new firm’s costs are higher than 
claimed but, knowing that Heinz/Beech-Nut is less cost effective induces Gerber to set a higher price.  This in 
turn permits Heinz/Beech-Nut to pass the higher costs on to consumers, at least in part, by way of a higher price.
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to do so.32  By continuing to market the Beech-Nut line, the merged firm offers a product that is a 
relatively close substitute for the Gerber product.  As a result, unless the firms can reach an 
explicit or tacit agreement on prices, such a choice would intensifies the price competition 
between the two surviving firms.33  Heinz/Beech-Nut would instead do much better if it 
differentiated its product more substantially from Gerber’s by instead dropping the Beech-Nut line 
and marketing a product of the lower Heinz’s quality.34  In so doing, Heinz/Beech-Nut truly 
responds to the incentive to distance its product from Gerber’s as much as possible.  Table 4 
shows the results of this simulation.  Unlike the previous scenarios, where we compared the post-
merger price of the Heinz/Beech-Nut with the pre-merger price of Beech-Nut, we now compare 
this price with the pre-merger Heinz price since that is the product that continues to be marketed. 
                 Table 4
               Impact of Proposed Merger Assuming Full Cost Reduction
                 But That Heinz/Beech-Nut Quality Is That of Current Heinz
Change from             Post-Merger
Pre-Merger Price Market Share
Gerber                              29.3%                          66.7%
Heinz/Beech-Nut             25.8%                          33.3%
32 Cf. Michael Salinger, “Treatment of Efficiencies in Merger Enforcement,” Remarks Before the Antitrust 
Modernization Committee (Nov. 17, 2005)(“No matter how much we believe that efficiencies are a plausible outcome 
of mergers, we cannot conclude that a merger will generate efficiencies simply because the parties say it is so. Mere 
assertion is not proof or even, by itself, supporting evidence.”)
33
 The companies argued that Heinz would make a strategic choice to mimic Gerber.  Producing identical products in 
Bertrand (price) competition would yield marginal cost pricing and would not be profit maximizing.  The only way in 
which it would possibly be in Heinz interest to maintain price and increase quality would be if Heinz could “leap frog” 
Gerber in terms of brand image and perceived quality.  Given the promotional expenditures and history that have 
established each firm’s identity, this is not a plausible argument.  It is also not a complete one.  If Heinz can raise its 
perceived quality, Gerber can, too. In any case, as the FTC argued and the Court of Appeals found, if the merger took 
place and the new firm followed through on its pre-merger promise to become more like Gerber, it would have every 
incentive to find a means to coordinate with Gerber on pricing.  See note22, supra.  
34 See Ari Hyytinen & Otto Toivanen, “Monitoring and Market Power in Credit Markets,” http://fmwww.bc.edu/ 
RePEc/es2000/1879.pdf  (December 1999).  In discussing quality choices in a hypothetical bank market, Hnytinen 
and Toivanen explain that “Because the two banks want to avoid entering price competition in Bertrand fashion (in 
homogeneous goods), it is easy to verify that with simultaneous entry, there exist two asymmetric sub-game perfect 
equilibria.”  These are with, say, firm 1 choosing high quality and firm 2 choosing low quality or vice-versa.  Again, 
the point is that the firms wish to differentiate their products as much as possible so as to soften price competition.
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Under this scenario, prices rise quite dramatically.  This is true despite the fact that the high-
cost middle product has been eliminated.  Nor is this just a quirk result due to specific features of 
the baby food market.  Recent work by Norman, Pepall, and Richards demonstrates that in a 
vertically differentiated market, two merging firms that lie adjacent to each other in the quality 
ladder will always drop the higher quality product line so as to distance their product from the 
top quality good.35  They show that when this product selection choice is included in the strategy 
space of the merged firm the result is that consumer prices rise for virtually any plausible value 
of merger-generated cost efficiencies.  The above simulation based on the baby food case 
confirms this hypothesis.  Thus, while Heinz claimed that it would market the high-quality 
Beech-Nut product and compete “head-to-head” with Gerber, both intuition and the above 
simulation argue strongly that Heinz had every reason not to do this.  
The final problem that we consider reflects the concern stressed by the FTC itself, namely,  
that by creating a duopoly the merger would alter the nature of price competition in the market.  
In particular, the FTC feared that the merger would result in greater price coordination between 
the two surviving firms.  This view is consistent both with Stigler’s conceptual arguments that 
coordination is easier as the number of firms decreases and with much empirical evidence.36  The 
FTC also relied on the Stiglerian view that increased product and cost homogeneity would raise 
the chances of coordination.37  The question then is how precisely to model such coordination.
35
 George Norman, Lynn Pepall, & Daniel Richards, “Product Differentiation, Cost-Reducing Mergers, and 
Consumer Welfare,” forthcoming in Canadian J. Econ. (Nov. 2005).
36
 George Stigler, “The Theory of Oligopoly,” 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964).
37
 Trial tr. ___ (Dr. Hilke); Stigler, supra note __.   See also M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole, 
“The Economics of Tacit Collusion,” at 46, Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission (March 2003). 
Contrary to some thinking, cost differences and quality differences are not two sides of the same coin.  In a vertically 
differentiated setting, two firms with identical costs can each be profitable if they market different qualities.  The 
converse is not true.  If two firms have the same quality but different costs, the high-cost firm will have to exit. 
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There are many ways that firms may tacitly coordinate their prices without a formal, and 
illegal, price-fixing agreement.  One of the most common mechanisms, however, is for one firm 
to serve as a price-leader and all others to act as followers.  In this scenario, the leader firm takes 
all the initiative in announcing prices while the follower firms set their prices in reaction to the 
leader’s announcement.  As noted above, some such as William Kolasky38 and the Heinz expert 
economist at the trial, Jonathan Baker, have argued that the pre-merger market was best 
described precisely along such price-leadership lines with Gerber in the leadership role.  Yet, as 
we demonstrated with our first simulation (Table 1), the pre-merger market shares and prices are 
quite consistent with the absence of any price leadership dynamic.  From our perspective, then, 
the real import of Baker’s comment is that price leadership by Gerber might well be the most 
likely form that the tacit collusion feared by the FTC might occur.39
Accordingly, our final simulation asks what the post- merger outcome would be if the newly 
merged firm did indeed achieve the cost efficiencies claimed by its proponents and if it also 
chose, despite the negative profit consequences shown in Table 4 above to market a Beech-Nut 
quality product, but in which prices are coordinated by Gerber playing the role of price leader.  
Thus, in this setting, the assumption of simultaneous pricing is replaced with one in which 
Gerber announces its price first, after which Heinz then responds with the price that maximizes 
38
 Kolasky, W. “Lessons From Baby Food: The Role of Efficiencies in Merger Review,” 16 Antitrust Magazine 82 
(2001).
39
 This was the major charge brought by grocers in the prior baby food case.  See in re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 
166 F. 3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).  Yet in defense of the merger, the parties’ economic expert testified that he believed the 
pre-merger competitive environment was characterized by such a price leadership paradigm.  Trial tr. __ (Testimony 
of Professor Baker); Trial tr. __ ( See also W. Kolasky, “The Role of Economics in Merger Enforcement:  Efficiencies 
and Market Definition under Conditions of Price Discrimination,” Paper presented at Charles River Associates Conf. 
(Dec. 2002).  In prior litigation, however, the baby food companies argued that the industry was characterized by 
intense competition, and this argument won the day.  See in re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F. 3d 112 (3d Cir. 
1999): “Our review of the record convinces us that the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the defendants in 
their marketing activities acted independently rather than in "complete unanimity," competitively rather than 
conspiratorially, and aggressively rather than supinely.  There is positive and unequivocal evidence that the defendants 
engaged in unilateral, aggressive competition limited only by budgetary considerations, cash, and market conditions.”  
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its profit given the Gerber announcement.  Under such an arrangement, Heinz/Beech-Nut now 
has full information about its rival’s choice at the time that Heinz/Beech-Nut sets its price, and 
moreover, Gerber understands that this will be the case when it sets its own price initially.40  The 
outcome under this more coordinated pricing arrangement is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 
        Impact of Proposed Merger Assuming Utopian Scenario 
(Full Cost Reduction and Beech-Nut Quality)
       But That Gerber Is A Price-Leader
                                             Change from             Post-Merger
Pre-Merger Price Market Share
Gerber                              12.1%                           50%
 Heinz/Beech-Nut               4.9%                           50%
As Table 5 shows, the optimistic scenario again turns sour when simultaneous pricing is 
replaced with a more cooperative price leadership regime.  Former Gerber consumers either 
now pay a higher price or switch to the lower quality Heinz/Beech-Nut brand.  Former Beech-
Nut consumers now pay a higher price, too.  Former consumers of Heinz must now switch to 
a much higher priced Heinz/Beech-Nut brand.  
There is, however, a distinctive feature of the price leadership scenario.  This is that 
Heinz/Beech-Nut gains considerable market share relative to the other outcomes.  The reason for 
this is straightforward.  Prices are strategic complements.  That is, the higher the price set by 
Gerber, the higher the price that Heinz/Beech-Nut will want to set.  Gerber recognizes this and so 
sets a very high price.  In so doing, Gerber recognizes that such a high price opens the door for 
Heinz/Beech-Nut to follow with a smaller price that steals customers from Gerber. Gerber 
nonetheless will earn greater profits on the units that it does sell.  Indeed, both firms do better in 
40
 This change in assumptions reflects a shift in the competitive nature of the industry, though it may not fully capture 
the FTC’s concern that the merger would increase the likelihood of tacit collusion.   That is, the model continues to 
rely on basic game theory but uses the switch from simultaneous to sequential moves to capture the FTC’s argument 
the merger would lead to increased likelihood of tacit or express collusion and yet higher prices.
19
the post-merger world with price leadership than with simultaneous pricing (Table 2).  Gerber’s 
total profit increases by 12.6 percent while the Heinz/Beech-Nut profit more than doubles.41
It may seem somewhat surprising that the cooperative price leadership outcome shown in 
Table 5 raises prices less than the strategic product choice outcome described in Table 4.  Recall, 
however, that the products being offered in the market are much closer substitutes in the 
leadership game because here we assume that Heinz/Beech-Nut does indeed market a Beech-Nut 
quality good.  This gives Heinz/Beech-Nut much greater opportunity.  As noted above, when 
Gerber sets its price first, it faces the concern that Heinz/Beech-Nut will then announce a lower 
price that steals many Gerber customers.  Yet when Heinz/Beech-Nut markets a relatively close in 
quality to Gerber’s, even a small price cut will have precisely that effect.  As a result, Gerber has 
to be much more cautious about setting its price high in the first place when the two goods are 
closer substitutes.  In short, cooperative pricing under a price-leadership model would in fact lead 
to a substantial price rise on the order of eight percent or so when averaged across the entire market.  
It should also be clear from both Table 5 and the foregoing discussion that cooperative price 
leadership, while it enhances the profits of both firms, is particularly beneficial for Heinz/Beech-
Nut whose market share rises dramatically in this simulation.  This demonstrates a further 
weakness in the merging parties’ contention regarding scale economies.  Heinz/Beech-Nut 
claimed that the merger would permit it to achieve a large scale of operations that would, in turn, 
guarantee the realization of the claimed cost efficiencies.  The price leadership scenario results 
described in Table 5 make clear that this may be true—the merger may enable Heinz/Beech-Nut to 
41
 Again, assume 1,000,000 customers for convenience.  In the non-cooperative scenario assumed in Table 2, Gerber 
would sell to 670,000 customers at a price of $0.423 and a cost of $0.31 for a total profit of $75,710. Heinz/Beech-
Nut would sell to 330,000 customers at a price of $0.365 and again, a cost of $0.31, for a total profit of $18,150.  
Under the price leadership regime assumed in Table 5, Gerber now sells to only 500,000 consumers but at a price of 
$0.479.  Given its unit cost of $0.31, it now earns profit of $84,500.  Likewise, Heinz/Beech-Nut now sells to 
500,000 consumers at price of $0.393. Its total profit is ($0.393 - $0.31) x 500,000 = $41,500.
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win a large market share and to achieve all the alleged efficiencies—but that even so, those lower 
costs do not necessarily show up as lower prices to consumers.  If the FTC’s concerns regarding 
price coordination are valid, the merger puts consumers at risk even if Heinz/Beech- Nut realizes 
all the claimed cost savings and also wins a market share equal to that of Gerber’s.
6.  Summary and Conclusions
The FTC’s successful effort to block the proposed merger of the Heinz and Beech-Nut baby 
food operations in 2001 has led to much criticism concerning the antitrust agencies’ treatment of 
efficiencies.  Because the merger claimed significant cost savings, many had expected it to be 
approved, especially in light of the 1997 revisions of the Merger Guidelines integrating such 
efficiencies more completely into public policy.  Consequently, the case has led many observers to 
question what role, if any, antitrust policy will permit for cost efficiencies as a merger defense.  
We have used a standard model of vertical product differentiation to analyze the baby food 
case.  While such a model has not commonly been applied in merger analysis, we have shown that 
this framework describes reasonably well the observed pre-merger features of the market.   This is 
not to say that the complicated rivalries of the baby food market are exactly duplicated by our 
stylized framework.  However, we believe that our model fits the data well enough to yield useful 
insights about that industry.  In particular, the model should in our view satisfy the requirement 
expressed by one of the harshest critics of the baby food decision, William Kolasky, that, “An 
evaluation of the efficiencies claim does not really involve a weighing of the cost savings from the 
claimed efficiencies against the potential price increases from an increase in market power, but 
instead requires understanding how the efficiencies will change the competitive dynamics of the 
market.”42  Our model is a formal and rigorous way to generate such understanding.
42William Kolaski, “The Role of Economics in Merger Enforcement: Efficiencies and Market Definition under Conditions of Price 
Discrimination”, Charles River Associates Conference on Current Topics in Mergers and Antitrust Enforcement” at 9 (Dec. 11, 2002).
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Our model offers insights regarding both the pre-merger and post-merger baby food 
market.  First, contrary to what many appear to believe, Gerber’s large share of the pre-merger 
market is not necessarily evidence that competition in that market was moribund, or that the 
market was best described by a regime in which Gerber acted as a price leader while Heinz and 
Beech-Nut simply priced under the Gerber “umbrella”.  To the contrary and as noted above, the 
pre-merger market is quite consistent with non-cooperative, independent price-setting by each 
of the three firms in a setting in which all consumers agree that Gerber’s sells the highest 
quality product, Beech-Nut the second highest, and Heinz sells the discount brand.  
Second, when our model is applied to simulate the likely postmerger outcomes, the merit of 
the merger looks very questionable.  Failure to achieve less than 70 percent of the claimed cost 
efficiencies will render it harmful to consumers.  Moreover, even if all the claimed efficiencies are
achieved, the impact will be negative if the newly-merged firm chooses its product line 
strategically (i.e., in a manner to maximize profits), and not merely assumed to specialize in a 
Beech-Nut quality product.  Finally, if the post-merger market is characterized by tacit 
coordination implemented by price leadership, then even full realization of the claimed cost 
efficiencies and complete specialization in the Beech-Nut line will not be enough to undo the 
harmful effects of the greater price coordination that the FTC feared would result from reducing 
the number of active competitors to two.   
In short, once the baby food industry is viewed through a vertically differentiated lens, there 
are many ways that the baby food merger could have “gone wrong” for consumers even if 
virtually all the cost efficiencies that Heinz and Beech-Nut claimed were actually achieved.43
The simple fact is that price competition in vertically differentiated markets is “soft” and 
43 See F. M. Scherer, “ Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis” in Antitrust:  New Economy, New 
Regime, Second Annual Symposium of the American Antitrust Institute (Fall 2001):
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dominated by observed brand or quality differences with the result that merger-generated cost 
savings will not typically have a large impact on post-merger prices.  Of course, the claimed cost 
savings may themselves be doubtful,44 in which case the benefits claimed for the merger are even 
more questionable.  In any case, however valid are the claimed efficiencies, the merging parties 
assertion that they would market a close substitute for the Gerber product and compete with 
Gerber head on in the post merger market is far less credible.  In a vertically differentiated 
market, such a strategy is not profit-maximizing and, therefore, not believable.  Indeed, the 
FTC’s concern that the merger would facilitate price coordination is much more credible, as this 
is part of a profit-maximizing strategy.   
As noted, our analysis has particular relevance to the baby food merger because the 
vertical framework appears to fit that market remarkably well.  Whether the model applies with 
equal strength to other markets is less clear.  To the extent that vertical differentiation is an 
important dimension of the brand distinctions in general, however, our results do suggest that 
cost efficiency claims made in defense of a merger in a highly concentrated industry should be 
viewed with some skepticism.  The results further suggest that the choice between vertical and 
horizontal differentiation as the appropriate model is likely to have important ramifications for 
any efficiency defense.   
Finally, there will be many cases in which the evidence of both efficiency effects and anti-competitive effects 
is uncertain and inconclusive. In such cases, one needs presumptions as to the side on which the risks of error 
are less severe. At Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, we called such presumptions "tie-
breaking" rules. Recognizing that many and perhaps most mergers fail to enhance efficiency, the proper tie-
breaking rule would be to resolve the burden of doubt on the side of stopping questionable mergers. This 
appears to have been what the Court of Appeals did in preliminarily enjoining a proposed merger between 
the Heinz and Beech-Nut baby foods operations.   Finding that "the district court never explained why Heinz 
could not achieve the kind of efficiencies urged without merger," it ruled that the "public equities weigh in 
favor of injunctive relief."  As I read the case facts, the court was appropriately skeptical.
Interestingly, even Kolasky ultimately states that that “the court of appeals understandably found difficult to 
accept in a 3-to-2 merger” [that] “the efficiencies would have given the merged firm an incentive to behave as 
more of a maverick.”  William Kolasky, supra note ___, at 9.
44 See M. Salinger, supra note 32.
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Appendix:  The Vertically Differentiated Product Market Model
We define the indirect utility consumer  obtains from buying one unit of product i with 
characteristic content zi at price pi to be:
( ) { }iii pzVV += ,0max , i = 1,2,3 (A1)
Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the product that offers the highest utility 
provided, of course, that this utility is non-negative.  We assume that V is sufficiently high 
that the market is fully covered in any price equilibrium. We also assume that:   = 1 .
Thus, consumer preferences are indexed so as to lie in a unit interval.  This facilitates market 
share calculations as a firm’s market shares will be equal to its market share. 
Each firm has a given product quality Z.  For Gerber, Beech-Nut, and Heinz these are, 
respectively, ZG , ZB, and ZH with ZG > ZB > ZH.  We then define: BG ZZZ =1	 ; and 
HB ZZZ =2	
Each firm also has a constant unit cost C.  For Gerber, Beech-Nut, and Heinz these are, 
analogously, CG, CB, CH.  Here we assume that CB > CG = CH.  In particular, we assume that
CB  = 
CG = 
CH where 
 > 1.  
For prices PG, PB and PH such that each good has a positive market share, the market 
demands are given by:
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The firms independently choose the prices of their brands to maximize profits, which 
from (A2a)-(A2c) are defined respectively by G = (PG – CG) DG, B = (PB – CB)DB, and H =
(PH – CH)DH.  The best response functions are:
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In any equilibrium in which all three firms have positive market shares, the equilibrium 
prices are:
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Corresponding to these Prices are Equilibrium Market Shares:
( )HG
GB
G ZZ
Z
Z
CCS +
+=
632
2
1
	
	

                                                                (A5a)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )HG
HBGB
B ZZ
ZZ
Z
CC
Z
CCS 
+=
6332
21
21
		
		

                                (A5b)
( ) 263 12
	
	 +
=
HG
GB
H ZZ
Z
Z
CCS                                                                (A5c)
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The results in the text describing the initial market equilibrium are derived from setting   =  
0.012; = 1.012; ZG = 4.475; ZB = 4.307; ZH = 4.112;CG = CH = 0.28; and 
= 1.17.
 In the post-merger duopoly, define PHB = Heinz/Beech-Nut price; ZHB = Heinz/Beech-
Nut quality; and CHB = Heinz/Beech-Nut quality.  Likewise, define 	Z = ZG – ZHB.  Demands 
in this two-firm game are:
DG(PG, PHB) = Z
PP HBG
	
 ; and                                                                     (A6a)
DH(PG, PHB) = Z
PP BG
	                                                                                 (A6b)
With simultaneous Bertrand competition, firms set prices to maximize profit defined as 
above.  This yields the following best response functions for the postmerger game:
( )[ ]
2
HBGHBG
G
ZZPCP ++=  (A7a) 
[ ]
2
ZPC
P GHBHB
	+=                                                                                  (A7b)
Equilibrium prices for any two-firm simultaneous Bertrand game are:
( )
3
2
3
1
3
2 ZCCP HBGG
	 ++= (A8a)
( )
3
2
3
1
3
2 ZCCP GHBHB
	 ++=                                    (A8b)
Equilibrium market shares for any simultaneous Bertrand game are:
3
2
3

	
+=
Z
CCS GBG                                                                                     (A9a)
3
2
Z3
CCS GBHB

	
+= (A9b)
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For a sequential price setting game in which Gerber goes first, define Gerber and 
Heinz/Beech-Nut unit costs respectively as CG and CHB.  Gerber’s optimal price is then given by:
22
HBG
G
CC
ZP
++

 = 	                                                                           (A10)
The Heinz/Beech-Nut price may then be calculated using the best response function in equation 
(A8b), above.  In turn, these prices may be used to calculate market shares from equations (A6a) 
and (A6b).
